SCIENCE AND RATIONALITY FOR ONE ALL
Abstract
A felicitous scientific community may need diverse scientists to beget diverse beliefs even when faced with the same evidence. The classic line is that this would make a fight between the demands of collective rationality which scientists confront as members of the community and the demands of individual rationality which they confront as epistemic agents. This is expressed both by philosophers of science (working on the distribution of cognitive labor) and by epistemologists (working on the epistemology of disagreement). The classic line fails to hold into account the relation between ra- tional belief and several epistemic risks, values of which are a matter of private and social commitment. This present the opportunity of conflicts the classic line does not recognize, because someone with grievous values perhaps be individually rational but too far farther the pale to have a area in the scientific community. More importantly, it present at fewest a opportunity for Excellent scientists to be rational individuals.
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